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All developed countries have been struggling with a trend toward health care absorbing an
ever-larger fraction of government and private budgets. One potential solution is to rely
more heavily on studies of the costs and effectiveness of new technologies in an effort to
ensure that new spending is justified by a commensurate gain in consumer benefits. For
most nonhealth commodities, markets function sufficiently well to perform this function
unassisted. But in a market such as health care, effectiveness studies can (in theory) shed
light on what patients would have demanded in the absence of moral hazard and adverse
selection.
As one example, an Associated Press article described patient reactions to the price of a
$93,000 drug (Provenge) that extends life for incurable prostate cancer by an average of four
months (Marchione, 2010). One respondent, Bob Svensson, 80, a former corporate finance
officer whose insurance was paying for the treatment, declared: “‘I would not spend that
money,’ because the benefit doesn’t seem worth it …” Perhaps reassuringly, this particular
treatment would fail most cost-effectiveness guidelines.
In many high-income countries, government agencies are responsible for making nationwide
coverage decisions on medical therapies that are expensive and of uncertain benefit
compared to cheaper alternatives. In the United Kingdom, for example, the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) determines which treatments are
reimbursed under the National Health Service, and tends to look unkindly on those that
require spending more than about $50,000 to gain an extra (statistical) quality-adjusted year
of life. Alternatively, payers can set “reference prices” or upper limits on payments for
branded pharmaceuticals, as is done in Germany. A related approach to implementing cost
effectiveness would be to pay more for new innovations only if they offered some clear
advantage over existing treatments (Pearson and Bach, 2010).
In the United States, the original Medicare and Medicaid statutes prohibited the government
from reimbursing expenses incurred for “items and services that are not reasonable and
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of
a malformed body member.” Whether “reasonable” implied cost effectiveness was
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unspecified; in practice, individual physicians were entrusted to make this determination.
But in a world of fee-for-service reimbursement, this latitude encouraged the overuse of
technologies of dubious value. Successive program administrators wanted to interpret
“reasonable” as encompassing information about costs, and in the early 1990s, the
government proposed regulation that would do precisely this. Unsurprisingly, there was
massive opposition from patient advocacy groups (the American Association of Retired
Persons), physician lobby groups (the American Medical Association), and pharmaceutical
and device lobby groups (the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association of
America) who raised concerns about “rationing,” leading to the withdrawal of the proposal.
Consequently, the Medicare program continues to reimburse for any medical therapy
regardless of the incremental value of its benefit. In light of charges about “death panels” in
the debate surrounding the healthcare reform bill of 2010, Congress explicitly forbade the
use of cost-effectiveness analysis in government programs (Sections 1182(b)(2), 1182(c)(1),
1182(e) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
In this context, comparative effectiveness research emerged as an alternative strategy to
understand better what works in health care. Put simply, comparative effectiveness research
compares the efficacy of two or more diagnostic tests, treatments, or health care delivery
methods without any explicit consideration of costs. To economists, the omission of costs
from comparative effectiveness research might seem nonsensical, especially when
healthcare reform was motivated in part to restrain runaway cost growth (Garber and Sox,
2010).
We argue that comparative effectiveness research still holds promise. First, it sidesteps one
problem facing cost-effectiveness analysis—the widespread political resistance to the idea
of using prices in health care. Such resistance is not just from political interest groups, but
also from voters, who even in lab settings often dislike rationing based on cost effectiveness
(Nord, Richardson, Street, Kuhse, and Singer, 1995). Second, there is little or no evidence
on comparative effectiveness for a vast array of treatments: for example, we don’t know
whether proton-beam therapy, a very expensive treatment for prostate cancer (which
requires building a cyclotron and a facility the size of a football field) offers any advantage
over conventional approaches. Most drug studies compare new drugs to placebos, rather
than “head-to-head” with other drugs on the market, leaving a vacuum as to which drug
works best (Nathan, 2010). Simply knowing what works and what doesn’t will improve
productive efficiency by shedding medical practices that are unsafe at any price.
But not everyone is a fan of comparative effectiveness. Critics have focused on
heterogeneity of treatment effects across patients and physicians. A randomized trial may
find no benefit on average, but this tells us much less about whether a specific subset of
patients (or patients of particularly skilled physicians) might still gain from the treatment
(Groopman, 2010). These critics suggest that “cookie-cutter” comparative effectiveness
coverage decisions can introduce rationing and ultimately worsen patient outcomes. And
while comparative effectiveness research can lead to cost savings (Perlroth, Goldman, and
Garber, 2010), adopting any treatment that improves health outcomes, no matter what the
cost, can worsen allocative inefficiency by paying dearly for small health gains. Of course,
cost-effectiveness studies that explicitly account for both costs and benefits of healthcare
choices would avoid this type of allocative inefficiency, but could introduce other problems,
such as provider inertia or drug or device suppliers increasing prices so that they fall just
short of cost-effective hurdle rate set by third-party payers.
The real question, though, is whether comparative effectiveness or cost-effectiveness
research can help to break the inexorable growth in healthcare costs threatening the solvency
of state governments and the U.S. federal government. Some moderating effects might be
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expected if such research can be used to nudge patients away from less-effective therapies,
whether through improved decision making or by encouraging beefed-up copayments for
cost-ineffective procedures. More promising still for reducing growth is the use of a
comparative or cost-effectiveness framework to better understand where the real savings lie
—and the real savings may well lie in figuring out the complex interaction and
fragmentation of healthcare systems.
A Primer on Effectiveness Research
The Institute of Medicine, the independent nonprofit organization that is a part of the
National Academy of Sciences, defines “comparative effectiveness research” as “the
generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms of alternative
methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or improve the delivery
of care.” Benefits can be measured in a number of ways. When comparing treatments for
hypertension, for example, efficacy may be measured in terms of life-years saved, strokes
prevented, or heart attacks avoided. When comparing diagnostic tests such as CT
colonography and colonoscopy to screen for colon cancer, efficacy may be measured by
additional cases of disease diagnosed.
One common measure of effectiveness of a healthcare treatment is a “quality-adjusted life
year” or QALY. This calculation is done by looking at the additional years of life a
treatment provides, weighting those years by the quality of health in each year. The quality
rankings range from a value of one for perfect health to a value of zero for death, and even
allow negative values for especially unpleasant states of being alive. The quality rankings
are determined by looking at the ability of individuals to function along five dimensions:
mobility, pain/discomfort, self-care, anxiety/depression, and carrying out normal activities
like work, study, and leisure. A healthcare treatment thus could add to years of live, or
improve the quality of years of life, or some mixture of the two. The coarser the measure of
benefits (for example, measuring survival, but not pain and nausea), the less useful the
results of an effectiveness study.1
In comparative effectiveness research, the goal is to choose the option with the best health
outcome. In an ideal world where all approaches to treating patients—given an existing
body of scientific knowledge—are tested against one another, we could improve along each
step of the way the overall health of the population. In this hill-climbing exercise, we would
end up at a point where health is maximized, regardless of costs.
Figure 1 displays the association between factor inputs on the horizontal axis and survival/
quality of life on the vertical axis. A concave production possibility frontier illustrates the
maximum aggregate health for a given level of inputs. The U.S. healthcare system,
represented by point A in Figure 1, falls far short of the production possibility frontier,
whether because of wasteful costs (as discussed by Cutler and Ly in this issue), or because
of shortfalls in health outcomes which would include both reductions in health and lives lost
owing to sins of omission (lack of effective care such as prophylactic antibiotics prior to
surgery) or sins of commission (Brenner and Hall, 2007, estimated that the overuse of CT
and MRIs cause 1.5–2.0 percent of total cancers). The application of comparative
effectiveness research to every possible treatment option would move the country to point B,
at the peak of the production function. This point would almost certainly be more costly than
our current status quo, but would represent a point where all possible health-related gains
have been exhausted.
1An alternative to the QALY is disease-adjusted life-years (DALYs), which differ primarily in measuring disease (rather than health)
and allows for age-based weights. See for example Robberstad (2005).
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While point B is productively efficient, it is allocatively inefficient, given that the foregone
consumption of attaining that last QALY is so high at point B (Garber and Skinner, 2008).
By contrast, the objective of cost effectiveness is to adopt only those treatments that yield
QALYs at a reasonable cost—where “reasonable” is of course open to interpretation. If we
adopt for convenience a guideline of $100,000 per QALY or unadjusted life-year (a
parameter we discuss later in the paper), then an exhaustive set of studies would again lead
us into productive efficiency but at a different point on the production possibility frontier
(specifically, at point C). At this point, the slope of the frontier is equal to the inverse of this
cost-effectiveness “hurdle” rate, in this case 1/$100,000. Economists would prefer point C to
B since the forgone (nonhealth) consumption involved in getting from C to B exceeds the
value of improved health. Intuitively, with the cost-effectiveness approach, all potential
treatments are considered, but only those options that improve health for less than $100,000
per QALY, or that scale back on treatments costing more than $100,000 per QALY (such as
that anticancer drug that cost an average of $93,000 for an average gain in life of four
months) are chosen. In the aggregate, health outcomes would improve and costs would
likely decline, but some subsets of the population, such as incurable prostate cancer patients,
could end up being worse off (Weinstein and Skinner, 2010).
The Promise of Comparative Effectiveness Studies
In many cases, comparative effectiveness studies can lead to cost savings. One recent
randomized trial compared patients with terminal lung cancer; half were randomized into
early palliative care and the other half received regular chemotherapy treatments (Temel et
al., 2010). Those in early palliative care experienced better quality of life, lower costs, and
longer survival.
Another example of cost-saving comparative effectiveness research comes from
arthroscopic surgery for osteoarthritis of the knee, in which surgeons enter the knee in a way
that is minimally invasive and clean out particles from the joint using a sophisticated camera
to guide their movements. Prior to 2002, over 650,000 such surgeries had been performed
each year. In that same year, a landmark study (Moseley et al., 2002) demonstrated that
compared to a control group of patients receiving “placebo surgery”—skin incisions and
simulated surgery—there was no benefit from arthroscopic surgery, leading to a subsequent
decline in its use (Hawker, Guan, Judge, and Dieppe, 2008). Perlroth, Goldman, and Garber
(2010) suggest that comparative effectiveness research could save up to $3 billion annually
by establishing that for prostate cancer patients, prostatectomy ($7,300 cost) yields results as
good as brachytherapy or radiation seeds ($19,000) and radiation therapy ($46,900).
Similarly, with cost effectiveness and comparative effectiveness it is easy to make the case
for the use of costly percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI), a technique in which
narrowed or blocked blood vessels of the heart are opened by inserting an inflatable balloon
and often kept open by introducing a coronary stent. (Percutaneous means that the
intervention is done through the skin; coronary means that it is done for a blood vessel in the
heart.) This technique has been shown to improve survival dramatically compared to drug
therapy alone following a heart attack if performed within the first 12 or 24 hours following
its onset, and thus it is highly effective (and cost-effective) for this use (Hartwell et al.,
2005).
However, in the evaluation of PCI for patients with stable angina (chest pain and associated
symptoms caused by strenuous activity), comparative effectiveness and cost effectiveness
part ways. For this group, accounting for about one-third of all PCI procedures, clinical trials
have found no mortality benefit and little (and transitory) symptom benefit of PCI relative to
drug therapy alone (Boden et al., 2007; Weintraub et al., 2008). The positive benefit means
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that it passes the comparative effectiveness test; the small magnitude of the benefit and its
high cost means that it fails the cost-effectiveness hurdle. But all is not lost for those who
worry about allocative efficiency: armed with this new information, patients nervous about
invasive procedures are now able to make better decisions, and evidence suggests that well-
informed patients tend to want less cardiac surgery, not more (Morgan et al., 2000).2
Avoiding all mention of costs makes comparative effectiveness less appealing for
economists but possibly more appealing for voters. An intriguing strand of the literature
argues that voters, at least Australian ones, simply do not agree with the principle of cost-
effectiveness analysis. In a survey conducted Down Under, respondents were asked about
hypothetical choices between treating people with Disease X, which is treated cheaply,
versus Disease Y requiring more expensive treatments (Nord et al., 1995). Respondents
understood the trade-off and that spending a fixed budget to save people with Disease Y
would lead to fewer overall lives saved. Five options (I through V) are shown in Table 1,
with total lives saved in the third row. Just 6 percent of the population chose the cost-
effective solution (V), and about as many choose the least cost-effective approach (5
percent). Nearly half chose III, leading to just 34 lives saved instead of the maximum of 50.
This result could reflect to some extent “central tendency” of respondents to choose what
appears to be the median option, although it is also intriguing that option II substantially
outpolled option IV. However, it also appears that the respondents viewed the cost-effective
approach as unfair because it failed to insure against the risk of contracting a disease that
was more costly to treat.
The Oregon experiment in cost-effective rationing can be viewed as a realworld example of
the disconnect between the principles of cost effectiveness and voter preferences. Starting in
1989, Oregon embarked on a state-level effort to expand Medicaid health insurance
coverage to more of its citizens and to finance this broader increase by providing a more
limited package of healthcare services. Oregon ranked more than 700 healthcare services
according to the desirability of coverage using a panel comprising patients and providers,
and the Oregon legislature chose a level below which services would not be covered by state
Medicaid. Controversy around this list arose when it was published: for example, life-saving
surgical treatments for ectopic pregnancy and appendicitis were ranked below less-important
procedures like dental caps for pulp exposure and splints for temporomandibular joint
disorder (Hadorn, 1991). Though cost-effectiveness analysis suggested that the net value to
society of treating 100 patients with painful temporomandibular joint disorder was of greater
net value than saving a single life, the experiment failed. At a minimum, the episode
suggests that even when there is some general level of acceptance for the cost-effectiveness
argument, implementation is controversial and difficult.
More generally, there appears to be a disconnect between how people think of the whom-to-
cover trade-off versus the what-to-cover trade-off (Baicker and Chandra, 2010). People
seem to prefer that health care for the insured not be rationed. But providing generous
coverage—drugs, hospitalizations, outpatient services, proton beam therapy, long-term care
—to some and nothing to others, is also a form of rationing.3 It costs the same to insure 30
million people with a policy that has an annual premium of $6,000 per year as it does to
insure 50 million people with a policy whose premium is $3,600. To date, the debate about
2All this said, overall rates of PCI have continued to rise, suggesting that physicians who believe in the procedure, or those whose
economic interests would be devastated by recommending against it, are having a greater impact than physicians who are
nonbelievers.
3Some readers will note that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) forces hospitals to provide
emergency care in the emergency rooms without regard to citizenship or ability to pay. This is true, but EMTLA only requires
emergency department physicians to stabilize the patients, not to treat them; a cancer patient would not receive any care for their
cancer, nor a diabetic a prescription for insulin.
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the problem of healthcare costs has been mostly about excluding people from health
insurance (Sack, 2011) rather than cutting the generosity of public benefit packages.
Finally, the comparative effectiveness research can prove a useful first step even in the
absence of cost information if it provides key estimates of treatment effects, as Garber and
Sox (2010) have noted. After all, such effects are typically expensive to determine and
require years or even decades of data. Costs are much easier to measure, and can be
appended at a later date as financial Armageddon draws closer.
Challenges to Using Comparative Effectiveness Studies
Critics of comparative effectiveness focus on the possibility for heterogeneous patient
benefits, which reduce the benefits of what can be learnt from such studies. The
effectiveness of a treatment for a given individual can be broken down further according to
idiosyncratic patient attributes and according to the process or delivery system by which
treatments are delivered. These two forms of heterogeneity may result in some patients
benefiting from a treatment, while others are unaffected by it (or even harmed). Consider
again Figure 1, where initially one begins on the production possibility frontier at point D.
Now consider two approaches to expanding a new, potentially cost-effective treatment. In
the case where only those appropriate for care get it, outcomes and costs improve, to point
E, still on the “best practice” production possibility frontier. But in the case where treatment
is extended across all patients, corresponding to point F, outcomes are worse, and costs are
higher because the procedure is now done for a wider swath of patients. With variations in
healthcare systems with regard to appropriate use of new technologies, extending treatment
could even lead to a negative correlation between spending and outcomes, as illustrated by
points E and F.
Heterogeneity in Patient Benefit
Comparative effectiveness research may demonstrate the superiority of one treatment over
another when evaluated on average, even though the optimal treatment may vary across
patients. This problem would most naturally arise if benefits are imprecisely measured—
pain, nausea, or incontinence can be difficult to capture—and collapsed into a single
outcome index.
A more complicated situation arises when patient benefits are correctly measured, but some
patients benefit more than others from a treatment—a phenomenon known as “treatment
effect heterogeneity.” To illustrate, consider the biologic drug panitumumab (brand name
Vectibix) produced by Amgen. In 2007, the drug was evaluated in Europe for treatment of
metastatic colorectal cancer. The drug was rejected on the basis of similar efficacy to pre-
existing, less-expensive chemotherapy. After reviewing the initial submission data, it turned
out that those patients with a specific normal gene type were far more likely to benefit from
the drug than patients with a mutated gene. By the next year, the drug was approved for
patients with a normal gene. A comparative effectiveness study that focused only on the
average benefit of patients receiving panitumumab would miss the substantial benefit to a
particular subset of patients more likely to benefit. Treatment effect heterogeneity is likely
to increase in the future, as drug and biologic manufacturers develop therapies that are
tailored to people with certain genes (Garber and Tunis, 2009).
The solution appears straightforward: conduct more studies for the relevant groups.
However, this approach can be very expensive, particularly if one doesn’t know which
groups might benefit. If the results of average effects in a trial have just been announced,
and subgroup analyses are precluded by poor statistical power, then what? Binary coverage
decisions—cover/not cover—would raise concerns about potentially rationing valuable care
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in subpopulations, particularly where a physician believes on the basis of experience that a
specific patient might benefit (Groopman, 2010). A less-stringent use of this new
information would be to help “nudge” patients away from the treatment (Sunstein and
Thaler, 2008). If comparative effectiveness studies are used to determine patient cost-
sharing, or to design shared decision-making videos and to inform (but not determine)
provider behavior, then the scope for claiming that valuable care is being withheld is
substantially diminished.
Heterogeneity in Provider Skill
The effectiveness of a given technology may also depend on the skills of healthcare
providers. Providers who use a certain technology repeatedly may find that there are
economies of scale, learning by doing, or spillovers to other therapies. In heart disease, for
example, patients receiving coronary stents in low-volume medical centers have higher 30-
day mortality than patients treated in high-volume centers (McGrath et al., 2000). Chandra
and Staiger (2007) find that regions that specialize in treating heart attack patients with
intensive management (such as early percutaneous coronary interventions) obtain better
results with the therapy than regions relying mainly on medications alone (like aspirin, beta-
blockers, and statins).
Another example comes from carotid endarterectomy, a surgical procedure which removes
plaque from the inside of the carotid artery that supplies the head with blood, thereby
reducing the chance of stroke. In looking at hospital performance in the Asymptomatic
Carotid Atherosclerosis Study (ACAS), Wennberg, Lucas, Birkmeyer, Brendenberg, and
Fisher (1998) note dramatic differences in the mortality that occurs within two weeks of the
endarterectomy (known as “perioperative mortality”) depending on whether the procedure
was performed in one of the original clinical trial hospitals (1.4 percent mortality), in
nontrial hospitals with high volumes of endarterectomies (1.7 percent), or in hospitals with
low volumes (2.5 percent). In other words, procedures worth doing in academic medical
centers may not be worth doing in community hospitals. This raises the bar even further for
studies, requiring randomization across types of providers as well as patients.
How Much Will Comparative Effectiveness Research Cost?
Recall from Figure 1 that using a procedure only among appropriate patients leads to better
outcomes at lower costs (point E rather than point F). But this ignores the costs of
determining which subgroup is most appropriate for treatment. Thus, it is necessary to think
about value-of-information studies, which assess the value of obtaining additional
information on the clinical effectiveness of particular treatments (Dorsey and Meltzer,
2010). Broadly speaking, which treatments should be evaluated sooner rather than later will
depend on the degree of uncertainty about clinical effectiveness (perhaps determined by
expert panels and systematic review of the medical literature) and the potential total cost
savings associated with recommending various treatments—which in turn will depend on
the costs of various treatments and the number of people eligible for the treatment.
Observational studies and randomized control trials are two approaches to learning about
effectiveness. The former is substantially cheaper than the latter yet carries many caveats.
The simplest form of an observational study uses the standard “as treated” approach at the
individual patient level with either propensity-score matching or regression analysis with
covariates; there is no randomization and the researcher interprets the “treat/nontreat”
coefficient as the treatment effect.
Observational studies based on regression adjustments are cheap and relatively easy to
conduct, and an optimist might believe that observational studies with high-quality data
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identify treatment effects just as well as randomized control trials (Concato, Shah, and
Horwitz, 2000). But “just as well” isn’t always known until a trial is conducted. One
prominent example in recent years is hormone replacement therapy, which was given to
millions of women in the belief based on observational studies that it reduced menopausal
symptoms and decreased heart attacks. However, randomized controlled trials in the late
1990s and early 2000s found that long-term use increased risks of heart attack and stroke
(Taubes, 2007).
The discrepancy between randomized trials and observational studies is most salient in
situations where the success of a treatment depends on patient factors that go beyond patient
severity. It becomes very hard for observational studies to control effectively for
confounding variables such as patient adherence, social and family support, and health
literacy. All of these factors affect outcomes, but each is notoriously difficult to measure and
thus to control for in a regression. Moreover, the reason that some patients stick with a drug
for a long time while others do not is that some patients experience side effects like pain and
nausea, while others do not. In such a world, compliance is correlated with benefit, and
simply “controlling” for patient factors is unlikely to yield a causal effect.
A more sophisticated class of observational studies tries to construct “natural experiments”
to estimate treatment effects, and thus owes more to the econometrics literature. For
example, distance to a catheterization lab has been used as an instrument for healthcare
intensity (McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse, 1994), while discontinuity designs (possible,
for example, when birthweight cutoffs determine admission to a intensive care unit as in
Almond, Doyle, Kowalski, and Williams, 2010) have been used to sidestep the otherwise
daunting biases inherent in individuallevel as-treated models. But the power of this
methodologically superior approach is still limited because not every treatment displays a
discontinuity or instrumental variable to mimic randomization. Furthermore, the estimated
treatment effect is known to be valid only in the vicinity of the discontinuity.
For these reasons, the randomized controlled trial is viewed as the gold standard for
evidence. Unfortunately, randomized trials are also expensive. For example, preapproval
clinical testing done by pharmaceutical companies as part of getting approval from the Food
and Drug Administration—so-called Phase III testing—for a single drug costs roughly $86
million (in 2000 dollars), according to a study by DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003).
Randomized control trials designed to generate comparative effectiveness research on drugs
already known to be efficacious could be less expensive or more expensive, particularly if
performed in expanded patient populations to study subgroup efficacy.
Who will cover the cost of these randomized trials? The answer is not always clear. In July
2005, clinical trials established the effectiveness of the biologic drug ranibizumab (brand
name Lucentis) in the treatment of macular degeneration, in which older adults suffer retinal
damage and severe vision loss (Martin, Maquire, and Fine, 2010). While awaiting approval
from the Food and Drug Administration for the new drug, ophthalmologists used an
alternative drug (bevacizumab or Avastin, which already had approval), that was essentially
identical but significantly cheaper—only $50 per dose versus $2,000. Comparing the two
treatments is an obvious application of comparative effectiveness. Yet no institution was
initially willing to step up to fund such a study, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services for a variety of reasons could not pay for the full cost of the drugs; the study was
saved only by the National Institutes of Health stepping in at the last minute to provide $25
million in funding on an ad hoc basis. This example underscores the importance of having a
mechanism for paying for the treatment while it is being evaluated—a manufacturer may
underwrite the costs for a trial in a group where the treatment is expected to work, but will
be unwilling to do so for head-to-head comparisons where effectiveness is less clear. In
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addition to highlighting the issue of the costs of paying for treatments in trials, the example
of Lucentis versus Avastin also underscores the tremendous benefit from conducting trials
of efficacy for similar drugs with dissimilar pricing. Both drugs are made by Genentech,
they are in the same class, and have fundamentally similar mechanisms of action. But
Lucentis was developed to capture the higher surplus associated with treatments for macular
degeneration; its development was a mechanism to price discriminate.
Given that the United States now spends close to 18 percent of GDP on healthcare (a level
of spending close to $8,000 per capita), it seems reasonable to pay a small fraction of this
cost towards figuring out what works and what does not. The current National Institutes of
Health budget is about $31 billion per year ($100 per person), and even tripling the NIH
budget to do more effectiveness research would mean that approximately 2 percent of total
healthcare spending would then be spent on how to make care more effective. Relative to
the cost of developing a new drug this is a small amount of spending; one study estimates
that recent drugs have cost $868 million per drug to develop, with a range of $500 million to
$2 billion (Adams and Brantner, 2006). Further, spending more on learning what works
should be viewed as an investment if it bends the cost curve trajectory. It is also plausible
that this kind of knowledge has a strong public good aspect, which would imply that society
has underinvested in such research. No individual insurer—whether Medicare or a
commercial provider—will fully internalize the benefits of learning the appropriate
frequency of office visits or whether Avastin increases survival among patients with
metastatic colon cancer. The presence of such knowledge externalities would suggest a
powerful role for federal funding of these trials, perhaps funded through taxes imposed on
the healthcare industry.
Towards the Gold Standard: Adding Costs to Effectiveness Analysis
Of course, comparative effectiveness isn’t enough for cost-effectiveness, which depends on
the societal value of the additional life gained and the relative cost of achieving that gain.
The costs and benefits in cost-effectiveness analysis should reflect the lifetime costs and
benefits associated with each intervention (Meltzer, 1997). To compare value to costs,
economists have proposed converting quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) to dollars. The
conversion factor was initially suggested as $50,000 per QALY, based on a 1984 Canadian
study of annual costs of care for patients with end stage kidney disease on dialysis
(Winkelmayer, Weinstein, Mittleman, Glynn, and Pliskin, 2002). Since that time, it has been
updated for inflation to $100,000 per QALY (Lee, Chertow, and Zenios, 2009). An
alternative way of rationalizing this figure is to use annual salaries in industrialized nations
to value an additional year of life; for example, an annual salary of $30,000 for a 40-hour
work week would lead to a value of a life-year of approximately $100,000 if leisure time
were valued at the same rate as the market wage (also see Garber and Phelps, 1997). Clearly,
there is considerable uncertainty about what is “the” value of a life, with some estimates
topping $300,000 per year (Murphy and Topel, 2006).
When treatments are comparatively effective but cost more than $100,000 per additional
QALY in the United States, they are generally viewed as not being cost effective, even if
Medicare or private insurance companies continue to pay the bills (Cutler, 2004). In
countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, treatments whose incremental life
extensions cost more than $50,000 per QALY are routinely denied coverage. For example,
in a highly publicized coverage decision regarding the biologic medication bevacuzimab
(Avastin), the United Kingdom refused national coverage of the drug for patients with
metastatic colorectal cancer on the basis that the drug improved life expectancy by six
weeks over the preexisting standard of care but cost an additional $110,000 dollars per
QALY to do so.
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Aren’t Prices Charged for Treatments Endogenous?
A subtler point is that most cost-effectiveness studies use the price charged to the national
health plan or insurer as the measure of cost rather than the actual cost of production. The
difference between price and cost is a particularly important issue in health care, where new
technologies or patented inventions often have prices that far exceed the costs. A patented
drug may have a high mark-up, while another drug that is equally costly to produce may be
priced much cheaper if that drug’s market is more competitive. If prices are used instead of
costs in a cost-effectiveness analysis, the analysis may not lead to the socially efficient
outcome ( Jena and Philipson, 2010; Basu and Philipson, 2010). Indeed, in the case of
multiple drug-resistant tuberculosis treatments in developing countries, global health leaders
were able to negotiate the price of drugs down by as much as 90 percent, suggesting that
many cost-effectiveness ratios using prices should be viewed as opening bids in a process of
price negotiation (Kim et al., 2005).
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Healthcare Delivery Systems
Cost-effectiveness research may ultimately deliver its largest productivity improvements
through the analyses of healthcare delivery systems, which vary greatly in their use of office
visits, specialist consultations, outpatient services, and imaging technologies. Evaluating
these interventions separately is tricky given the complicated production function that maps
these inputs into health. But evaluating the overall productivity of different delivery systems
offers great potential for substantial cost saving. To illustrate, leading medical care centers
have nearly two-fold range in risk-adjusted costs in their care of patients with heart attacks,
largely due to how frequently patients are seen and how often they are referred to specialists,
cared for in the hospital, and subject to diagnostic testing and imaging (Fisher, Gottlieb, and
Wennberg, 2004). These differences are unlikely to be the consequence of one hospital and
not another having access to new technology, because every hospital in the sample is a
teaching hospital; these differences primarily reflect “how” care is provided.
Comparative effectiveness analysis of the delivery system can identify efficiency at the
system level. We illustrate the promise of this approach in Table 2. The first column
provides summary measures of cost changes and outcomes changes for the 25 largest
hospitals treating Medicare heart attack patients.4 Since 1992, one-year mortality after heart
attack has fallen by 4.9 per 100 heart attack patients (in medical terms, those who suffered
an acute myocardial infarction). Most of this decline occurred in the early to mid-1990s;
more recently mortality gains have slowed. Risk-adjusted inpatient Medicare expenditures
for those with a heart attack rose by $7,397 during this period, implying a cost effectiveness
of overall inpatient treatment of $12,455 per life-year (Cutler and McClellan, 2001).
This same calculation was then carried out for each of five large hospitals separately, shown
in the remaining columns of Table 2. The hospitals are ranked by their own cost
effectiveness, again defined as the change in expenditures divided by the change in risk-
adjusted life expectancy. For the five hospitals chosen, individual cost-effectiveness ratios
ranged from one that was highly favorable (A), just $5,064 per life-year, to a ratio of
$163,633 for Hospital D, and to an undefined ratio for the least effective hospital (E),
because expenditures rose while mortality did not change. While percutaneous coronary
intervention (PCI) rates grew in all five hospitals (from 27 to 47 percent of patients on
average), there was not a strong correlation between either levels or rates of this growth,
4The results presented here are similar to those for the entire sample. We began with a 100 percent sample of Medicare Part A claims
data from 1992–2004 to create a longitudinal cohort of fee-for-service enrollees, age 65 or over, coded with a new acute myocardial
infarction, and risk-adjusted as in Skinner, Staiger, and Fisher (2006), limiting the sample to larger hospitals with at least 250 heart
attack patients in any given year.
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whether among the five hospitals, or more generally among all hospitals. Clearly, the “cost
effectiveness” of each hospital is determined by factors that have little to do with rationing
care, and more to do with efficient organization of inpatient services and avoiding
fragmented post-acute care once the patient has left the hospital.
At least one physician would seem to agree with our optimism for greater cost effectiveness
of the delivery system. The surgeon Atul Gawande (2007) writes: “[T]he scientific effort to
improve performance in medicine—an effort that at present gets only a miniscule of
scientific budgets—can arguably save more lives in the next decade than bench science,
more lives than research on the genome, stem cell therapy, cancer vaccines, and all the
laboratory work we hear about in the news.” In other words, simply learning how to better
use what we already have may prove more valuable for patient health than new scientific
discovery.
Conclusion
Comparative effectiveness analysis may appear inadequate to the task of taming healthcare
cost growth in the U.S. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, the nonprofit
private entity created by the 2010 healthcare reform legislation, cannot even consider costs
in its findings, as Congress prohibited its use of “a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year (or
similar measure …) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or
recommended” (Garber and Sox, 2010).
But this view is too narrow. Comparative effectiveness research adds to the public
knowledge-base about what works in healthcare and what doesn’t, as Garber and Sox (2010)
have emphasized. The costs of such research may appear large relative to the current size of
the budget of the National Institutes of Health, but these investments in scientific
knowledge, like traditional investments in biomedical research, can yield substantial benefits
by adding to the long-term stock of scientific knowledge (Murphy and Topel, 2006). Still,
opponents of comparative effectiveness research raise two concerns: first, that in a world
where each patient responds differently to a treatment, a move towards greater effectiveness
studies would reduce welfare by ignoring the heterogeneity in benefits; and second, that
such efforts “ration” care. Both views are overly simplistic.
While recognizing the inherent downside of “cookie-cutter” rules for treating patients, one
can still find value in comparative effectiveness research. It’s certainly true that a
randomized study may report an average-effect of the treatment, averaged over subgroups of
patients, and thus not tell us treatment effects about a specific patient being seen by a
specific doctor (Groopman, 2010). But knowing the average effect is better than the status
quo of having no published knowledge—a lacuna. Nor in the absence of comparative
effectiveness studies can one rely on Bayesian physician learning to converge towards the
universal optimum; different physicians converge to very different decision rules, and they
are unlikely to all be correct (Sirovich, Gallagher, Wennberg, and Fisher, 2008). History has
repeatedly shown that decision making based solely on physician experience can be wrong,
and sometimes with devastating consequences. Examples in breast cancer include radical
mastectomy (which offered higher morbidity along with no survival benefit) and high-dose
chemotherapy followed by bone-marrow transplants to rebuild the immune system. In both
cases, some physicians loudly proclaimed that trials were unethical because it was so clear
that the more aggressive treatment was superior, an argument that was only silenced when
trials came along.
Fears about how comparative effectiveness research will ration care also appear
shortsighted. Some patients will get more valuable care with effectiveness studies. But
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offering treatments without regard to value—whether chemotherapy, angioplasty, proton
beam therapy, or others—simply means greater financial pressures in the public and private
sector to ration care to other patients by cutting insurance coverage (Sack, 2011).
Can comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness research really help to moderate
healthcare cost growth? Our answer is a guarded yes: the research provides necessary but
not suffifi cient information to change the behavior of patients and providers. Comparative
effectiveness research generates useful information to assist patient decision making. But
it’s not enough just to publish the research; the information must also reach those patients
who have overly optimistic perceptions of treatment Benefits (Rothberg et al., 2010). Nor is
it enough to assume that comparative effectiveness research will change physician behavior.
One recent study found no Benefit from vertebroplasty, a surgical procedure that injects
cement into the spine for stabilization; still, one radiologist declared that, despite the study,
he “will continue to recommend the surgery because he has seen its Benefits” (Lazar, 2009).
Even “black box” warnings about elevated heart attack risk from using the drug
rosiglitazone for diabetes—that is, warnings on the package surrounded by a black box that
is intended to emphasize the concern—led to only modest reductions in its use for some
regions of the United States (Shah, Montori, Krumholz, Tu, Alexander, and Jackevicius,
2010).
Clearly, lack of research is not the only obstacle standing in the way of using comparative
effectiveness research to reduce healthcare costs. The inability or unwillingness of providers
and policymakers to use the information gleaned from comparative effectiveness research to
make actual changes in reimbursement or patient cost-sharing may be just as important.
Despite genuine efforts by Medicare offifi cials to use cost-effectiveness analysis to
determine reimbursement and coverage decisions in the Medicare program, Congress has
been unwilling to do so. In court, insurance contracts are often interpreted in favor of the
insured, and courts are reluctant to use published scientific literature to make rulings about
what should be covered and what should not (Ferguson, Dubinsky, and Kirsch, 1993). Given
that Medicare reimburses without regard to the underlying value of health gains, or health
gains relative to alternative treatments, it becomes very difficult for a private insurer,
especially a single insurer, to take the lead on applying comparative effectiveness research
(Chandra and Skinner, forthcoming).
Still, both private and public insurers might make more widespread use of comparative
effectiveness research to determine patient cost-sharing based on the efficacy of a drug,
therapy, or device. Private insurers are not forbidden from using “value-based” insurance
design that lowers copayments and coinsurance for proven treatments and raises prices to
patients (and perhaps lowers prices to providers) for procedures that are of marginal value in
comparative effectiveness research (for example, Chernew, Rosen, and Fendrick, 2007). The
key point, though, is that comparative effective research be used to nudge patients rather
than to disallow coverage entirely, minimizing concerns about “rationing.”
A more ambitious approach would use “dynamic pricing”—that is, Medicare would pay
providers more for treatments with demonstrated superiority, and the same for two
treatments with identical outcomes (Pearson and Bach, 2010). This switch would move
away from the binary cover/not cover decision, but would also require substantial changes in
law and political processes that could (unfairly) invoke cries of rationing.
One area where cost-effectiveness analysis may prove to be particularly potent is in
evaluating the relative efficiency of different delivery systems—here, effectiveness analysis
isn’t being used to evaluate narrow scientific discoveries (drugs or procedures), but to direct
how care is delivered. The efforts of the 2010 U.S. healthcare legislation to encourage
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“accountable care organizations” could in theory help to encourage greater attention to the
cost effectiveness of healthcare systems; shared-saving “bonuses” would be provided to
healthcare organizations that are able to provide high-quality care at lower costs (as
discussed in more detail in the paper by McClellan in this symposium).
This in turn would presumably increase demand for learning about efficient institutional
organization—such as weekend drop-in clinics rather than emergency room care—as well as
cost-efficient procedures. Estimates from the literature on geographic variation in health
spending suggest that, at a minimum, 20 percent of the $2.5 trillion spent by the United
States on health care could be saved if cost-effectiveness research guided the redesign of
inefficient healthcare systems (Skinner, Fisher, and Wennberg, 2005; Buntin and Cutler,
2009).
Over the medium- and long-term, as healthcare spending continues to rise, the financial
pressure to consider such system-level cost effectiveness will become colossal. The
implausibility of the marginal tax rates needed to finance government-provided health
insurance—reaching 70 percent or more by 2060 (as discussed in Newhouse, 2010; Baicker
and Skinner, 2011)—leads one to question not whether a fundamental shift in cost-growth
will occur, but when. Comparative effectiveness research and its half-sibling cost-
effectiveness research will provide a solid foundation for reform, once politicians and voters
understand how dismal is the alternative.
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Figure 1. Cost Effectiveness and Comparative Efficiency in a Healthcare Production Function
Note: Figure 1 displays the association between factor inputs on the horizontal axis and
survival/quality of life on the vertical axis. Point A falls far short of the production
possibility frontier. Comparative effectiveness analysis can help the movement towards
productive efficiency (point B), while cost-effectiveness analysis would identify the point at
which productive and allocative efficiency is achieved (point C).
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